

## **«Ukrainian nationalism» vs «Patriotism of Donbas» : the withstand of the media images in the contemporary informational space of Donetsk District.**

Pakhomenko Sergiy

In the post-Soviet scientific and lingual trend, the term “nation” often contains an “ethnic” shade of meaning. This causes a nation to be interpreted as a cultural rather than a purely political community united by its ethnic origin. Accordingly, “nationalism” is understood as an ideology and as a practice, which determines priority of one ethnic nation over all others. As regards to typology, this brings the term closer to such concepts as “xenophobia” or “chauvinism”. To a certain extent, this understanding of a nation dates back to the scientific and ideological doctrines of the Soviet period.

In the Soviet Ukraine, the term “Ukrainian nationalism” was the central one in the pantheon of anti-Soviet images used as a political label meant to typify the ethno-national movements as well as to characterize any manifestations of opposition to the policy carried out by the Communist party in the field of national issues. It was “Soviet internationalism” that was contrasted to “Ukrainian nationalism”.

In analyzing the media space of Donetsk District of 1990-2000, we found out that during the first decade of Ukraine’s independence, cherishing the image of Ukrainian nationalism in Donbas had primarily been the prerogative of marginal pro-Russian or communist mass media who denied the very idea of Ukraine’s independence.

As the regional economic and the political elites of Donbas were becoming stronger, the image of “Ukrainian nationalism” was becoming a tool meant to mobilize the electorate and to discredit the political opponents. This predetermined a much wider use of the image as well as its appearance in the district’s most respected periodicals controlled by the local political community. In the conditions of the regional split of the country’s political and ideological forces, “Ukrainian nationalism” was reanimated as a merely negative image linked with ethnic and cultural disgust. It also became the basic element in the set of views and values existing in West Ukraine, which are inadequate for (or even hostile to) the country’s east. Among them are such manifestations as Ukraine-centric interpretation of history, recognition of the Ukrainian Nationalist Association, the Ukrainian Rebellion Army and S. Bandera as heroes, attachment of priority to the Ukrainian

language, criticism of the Soviet heritage and creation of an artificial precipice between Ukraine and Russia.

In the course of the pre-election campaign of 2004, these markers of nationalism were for the first time united into a pattern of political technology, into a chain of associations connecting the political opponent with a certain region and, at the same time, in the way inadequate for Donbass: West Ukraine – the Ukrainian Nationalist Association and the Ukrainian Rebellion Army (pro-Bandera NGOs) – Ukrainian nationalism – fascism – President Yushchenko.

This pattern was used in mass media and in the following pre-election campaigns. The difference lay only in the person nominated as the political opponent.

At the same time, the antipode image, opposed to Ukrainian nationalism and endowed with the opponent strategy, adequate for and clear to Donbas, was being molded. Thus the image of the regional patriotism of Donbas emerged. Its design was based on such peculiarities of the regional identity as Russian-Ukrainian bi-ethnicity (dual identification, vague and obscure boundary between the Russian and the Ukrainian ethnicities), dominance of the Russian language, the industrial type of culture, the sincere cherishing of the Soviet past and its symbols, complementarities towards the Russian history and the Russian state.

The delicate method of introducing the image of Donbas patriotism into the public consciousness reveals itself in emphasizing the uniqueness of the region, its economic might and sport records as well as in criticizing the attempts of disseminating the Ukraine-centric matrix there. Vulgarization of Donbas's specificity caused the hypertrophic feeling of the regional patriotism to creep into the public consciousness. It brought about the belief in dominance and uniqueness, the belief in the slogan "Donbas feeds the entire Ukraine", especially the backward "nationalist" West.

Thus, in following the political ambitions of the regional elite and in appreciating the values of Donbas's population, the local mass media promote preservation and development of "the Soviet pattern" of the ideological image of Ukrainian nationalism. The main elements of that image, such as xenophobia and disgust, as well as the trend based on identifying certain manifestations of national identity which have nothing to do with right-wing ethno-nationalist views (recognition of the Great Famine in Ukraine as genocide towards the Ukrainian nation, for example) as nationalist ones are being reanimated. A brand new manifestation, hitherto unknown in the Soviet era, is emphasis laid on attributing nationalism to West Ukraine. The role of antipode to Ukrainian nationalism is now played by "Donbas patriotism", not by "Soviet internationalism".

## **The Phenomenon of the Donbas Regional Identity and its Correlation with the Ukrainian National Identity**

Olena Ivantsiv

Donetsk Coal Basin (Donbas) is one of the most industrialized and urbanized regions of Ukraine. Tragic history of the region influenced on the formation of the peculiar hierarchy of strong identities in which the regional identity is ranked one of the highest. Some scholars call this situation “the crisis of identities”, the others consider it the confirmation of the development of the special Donbas identity with its own mentality and values. However, one fact is unquestionable: the Donbas is no more Soviet, it is, certainly, not Russian and it didn’t become Ukrainian. What are the reasons of this crisis and of the regional identity strengthening in the Donbas? What historical events and peculiarities of the region’s development influenced on the present-day situation in the Donbas? What are the main distinguishing characteristics of the Donbas regional identity? And how does the Donbas regional identity correlate with the Ukrainian national identity?

The process of regional identity strengthening in the Donbas was influenced by historical, social and economic conditions. The foundation stone of this specific regional identity is not the ethnic and not even the language identification but historically formed social-economic reality of the Donbas which created some peculiar cleavage.

The Donbas during two centuries was a “melting pot” where different religious, cultural and language tradition were mixing. People moved there from all the provinces of the Russian Empire and foreign countries. The region attracted representatives of different strata, social position (including criminals, fugitives and other “undesirable elements”) and geographic regions which were mixed together in cities.

Alienation from the traditional rural mode of life, exhausting working conditions and complicated criminal situation made people unite in communities. Because of the mix of urban and rural traditions local residents got to the marginal state and had to get into this way of life, adapt to new realities and challenges.

The Donetsk identity is not rooted in any other identity. The residents of Lviv have also strong regional identity but it is deeply rooted in the national (Ukrainian) identity.

The strengthening of regional identity in the Donetsk region in 1990s and its significant growth by 2004 can be explained by the economic restructuring in 90s, creation of large industrial

holding companies, formation of the Donbas clan (consolidation of regional interests), its success in the economic growth in the region and spreading of its influence to the State authorities. The 2004 elections and the Orange Revolution united the Donbas residents; it played a great role in consolidation of the people in the region and widening the division between Western and Eastern Ukraine. The success of this “unite-split” campaign was reached because of the efficient use of election technologies.

The phenomena of the Donbas regional identity exceed the bounds of the internal political game. It has a long history of formation and someday this regional identity can make a great contribution into the development and strengthening of Ukraine or, on the contrary, it's decline. One factor is unquestionable the Donbas has a great potential and the Ukrainian government is responsible for its proper fulfilling.

### **Building the Hungarian public sphere in Romania after 1989**

TORÓ Tibor

As many of the researchers of the question pointed out, the history of the political representation of Hungarians from Romania after 1989 can be separated into three distinct periods, from the formation of a homogenous representation, through the institutionalization of an internal opposition and the later marginalization of these groups, to the period of pluralization, where new concurrent political actors appear. Despite these researched and revealed stages, few of the social scientists have focused systematically on the formation of the political representation, and the main discourses of this period and even fewer formulated a plausible hypothesis about why and how the development of the political representation changed in the aforementioned way.

The paper tries to design a possible analytical framework and research design for these questions, by analyzing the newly forming post-socialist political community and representation of the Hungarians from Romania from the perspective of public sphere theory. The concept of public sphere is used in the sense as Jürgen Habermas understood it in his early works, namely as the space where members of the public can meet in order to formulate their own ideas on the concept of public good. Although, as we know, his theory raises several questions from the one related to the actors and groups involved, through the one that focuses on the content of the public and rejects its homogenous nature, to the problematic definition of public good. In this paper I plan to reflect on

the following questions: why and how public sphere theory can be used in the analysis of minority elite discourses and what novelty and benefits does it offer from theoretical point of view?

In order to answer these questions I will focus on theoretical and empirical perspectives as well. From a theoretical point of view I will introduce some ideas on public sphere theory, focusing on the relationship between nationalism and public sphere and the importance of the so called “interpretative activists”, who formulate and transfer the social and political values of the group. Moreover, I will present the ideas and typology of Karl Mannheim on competition, which will prove useful not only in the examination of alternative public spheres but in the analysis of the dynamical relationship that occurs amongst them.

From an empirical perspective I will link the above-mentioned theoretical aspects to the need of understanding the causes and chains of events that shaped the development of the Hungarian political representation from Romania. My hypothesis is that after 1989 when the Romanian regime changed and political affiliation has become possible, the smaller local intellectual groups, started building a single public sphere, where on one hand the Hungarian community from Romania could have been formed, and on other hand the needs and expectations of this community could have been revealed. The legitimacy of these groups was earned during the period of socialism, when political activism was not possible, most of the constructions were done in a symbolic-cultural field.

## **National identity – definition and nature**

Jakub Wróblewski

The right to one's own identity is one of the most important liberties of the human being. The fall of the Communist regime paved the way not only to major economic changes, but also to an unprecedented evolution of new social movements in the post-communist countries. Those new movements cut across the traditional divisions of class, social layer or labour. They bring together people of different social status, bound solely by a common ideology.

My aim is to focus on groups whose binding factor is the feeling of shared national identity. This presentation offers an answer to the question of how the affiliates and members of these groups define their national identity and what it means to them these days.

I will discuss both Polish organizations active in Lithuania, Belarus, and the Ukraine, and movements which emerged in Poland after 1989, representing national minorities. The question of

national identity and its characterization is particularly relevant in the context of the 'Eastern' and 'Western' Europe growing ever closer to each other, as exemplified by the access of some post-communist countries to the EU, or the Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004/05.

## **Regional and National Identity in the Making of New Nation-States**

Gennadii Korzhov

The end of the XX century was marked by the growth of ethno-national feelings and nationalist movements in many countries of both Western and Eastern Europe. At the same time one could observe the rise of the phenomenon which not necessarily has ethnic or national substance, namely: regionalism and regional identity (RI). The actualization of regional identity is an important part of the political transformation of contemporary Ukrainian society. This identity plays a role of utmost importance in the constituting and institutionalizing of different regions as subjects of political, economic and social life in a number of post-socialist countries. According to Anthony Smith, regional or territorial identity can be referred to as one of the most fundamental components of the identification matrix of the individual<sup>1</sup>.

The actualization of territorial identifications was brought about by radical societal changes in Ukraine in the late XX – early XXI cc. The radical changes in all spheres of social-economic life and the emergence of new political entities – successors to the former Soviet Union – led to the reconstruction and re-evaluation of the whole system of the categorization of the social world, and to the deep crisis in the realm of formation and reinforcement of social identities. In conditions of multifarious challenges and threats produced by the transformation of the entire social fabric the strengthening of both regional and national identities became one of the most important forms of social adaptation to new socio-political realities. The search for some more or less stable points of orientation is strengthened by growing instability, unpredictability and multiple risks typical of present-day society. Strive for group belonging serves as a compensatory mechanism for the ever-increasing individualism of our contemporary world.

The existence of strong territorial identities (TI) of sub-national level is rather typical of the localities with historical, cultural, economic, and social peculiarities. This sort of identity may well

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<sup>1</sup> Smith A.D. National Identity. London: Penguin Books, 1991.

both complement and contradict to more universal national identity. Contemporary Ukraine is characterized by substantial regional differences determined by natural-geographical, economic, historical, and socio-cultural factors. These differences do not necessarily lead to the emergence and crystallization of particular RI. However, the specificity of populating (intensive migration, mixing up of various ethnic groups) and development of certain regions, in particular trans-border ones, for the long periods of time has resulted in the formation of strong RI that came to the fore and forced out national identities.

In the presented paper two interrelated issues will be discussed:

- 1) What does RI as an analytical concept mean?
- 2) How is RI interrelated with the adjacent concepts of ethnic and national identities?
- 3) In which way is regional identity used for the shaping of region as social and political entity and in the process of nation-state building?

The last two problems will be analyzed by using the Donbas (a region in Eastern Ukraine) as a case study.

## **The identity policy in CEE: between the national canon and normative influence of EU, case of Ukraine and Bulgaria**

Artem Gyeorganov

Each deep reformatting of political space inspires invariably reconceptualization of the base categories responsible for reproduction of social cohesion, and first of all such concept as „nation“. Thereby battlefield for identity becomes an important part of political combat, and political actors struggling for the power are obliged to aspire to grasp the institutional toolkit of applying the identity policy.

States of CEE show various trajectories of overcoming transformational crisis. But they are united by similarity of that set of challenges which they had to overcome. Among them, necessity of construction of the new symbolical space answering to the changed conditions of the international socialisation and the necessity of an internal legitimation of regime. At that, both these components are inseparable, but certainly not in rigid connection. So the East Europe politicians have found a possibility to combine a declared adherence of idea of the European integration with rhetoric of

borders' tightness, protection of „national“ interests and the „cultural-national“ rights of „compatriots“ living abroad. Thereby appealing to such a meta social category as „nation“ in its essentialist primordialist understanding became again an element of not only political rituals, but also practical actions.

In this value it is possible to allocate two basic variants of actualization of a national canon as a mechanism of unification of a symbolical, and consequently also political space of the national state. The first of them can be reduced to restoration of a nationalist discourse as the basic ideological way to aggregate different individual preferences and fuse them into political collective. That in its turn was a part of the general process of restoring the lines of continuity with the pre-communist statehood. In the majority of these countries national narrative has settled long before the arrival of communistic regime, and after that has been successfully integrated into ideological structures of modes „people's democracy“. At the same time, the country's second type, as a rule, did not have a long tradition of statehood, and consequently a settled national canon. Which thereafter has led these countries to face a problem of more serious reorganization of the model of identity. This type is characteristic, first of all, for the countries of the former USSR and SFRY. It is obvious, that the states of both types actively articulate to national categories, but the specificity of their use, methods and results of carrying out of a policy of identity essentially differ. So for the states of the second type specific complexities less actual for the first are inherent — in modern conditions they can't access the institutional toolkit of carrying out of a identity policy which has been earlier used by the states solving these problems in 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Proceeding from this understanding of a subject of our consideration is studying of experience of two states, from both groups, Ukraine and Bulgaria, and more exactly the revealing of specificity of carrying out of a identity policy in these countries.

Thus not only internal stimulus in carrying out of a identity policy are considered, but the role of the European institutions is also analyzed, first of all the one of the EU as a standard force rendering multilateral, as direct as also indirect influence on political processes in CEE. At that EU is interpreted as the political actor possessing own, though frequently informal, goals and strategies in carrying out a identity policy.

Thus, the submitted report will present our research's intermediate conclusions of the revealing of an interaction model devoted to a problem of supranational strategies of the European bureaucracy and particularistic interests of the national authorities as conceptual framework allowing productively to investigate changes in identity policy in CEE.



## **Idea of patriotism and nationalism in Russia, Poland and Ukraine at the beginning of 1990-th and now. Comparative research**

Zoriana Melnyk

In my paper I would like to present differences in idea of patriotism and nationalism in Poland, Ukraine and the Russian Federation after dissolution of the Soviet Union. These three countries are chosen because of strong mutual influences between history and society. I will focus mainly on the Ukrainian case, but to understand all changes that took place it is crucial to present Russian or Polish examples. After collapse of the USSR each of aforementioned countries was trying to find their own way politically, economically and ideologically. For Poland this way was strongly connected with the European integration processes. For the Russian Federation to remain as a huge, influential state. Finally for Ukraine to preserve and declare its right and ability to be an independent state. As we can see now most goals have been achieved. These states are not the same as they were in 1989. Values, ideas and perception have changed. I will underline one of them - the idea of nationalism and patriotism.

My research is based on sociological surveys presented by chosen countries and the World Values Survey. The main goal of my paper is to present changes that have taken place within past 20 years in those countries and also to demonstrate how these three countries influenced one another.

### **Time and Space in transition (Russia's case).**

Maria Rogińska

The presentation focuses on describing and analyzing mechanisms of Russian transformation process from the anthropological point of view (grounded, in particular, in Arnold van Gennep's insight into the rites of passage). Therefore transformation is shown as the liminal stage of the transition process characterized by collapse of the former cultural meta-narration (the Myth of Communism) and decomposition of the Soviet model of universe. In the final stage of the transition a new (although rooted in the old one) cultural narration is to be developed, and some new forms of the Russian cultural and "ontological" identity appear.

While investigating these processes, I pay special attention to the liminal changes in the symbolical forms of space and time in the Russian discourse of the 90s. The fact that Russian people conceive themselves as some marginal community, or ontological provincials, seems to be a reaction to the breakdown of the former symbolical space which is no longer experienced as central with regard to the rest of the world. The map of Russia turns up to be a fragile, easily broken substance, and when new independent countries emerge within it, the geographical imagination of the 90s turns this process into a drama of “crashing the map”. The transformational crisis in all spheres of life causes some significant changes within the category of temporality. Waiting for a better life which is not about to come, makes Russian people concentrate on the present. Presentism is characterized both by apathy and hurry which are the liminal symptoms of the former time structures downfall. Only the very moment of explosion in 1991 brings into the Russian reality a kind of feast aura or *carnival*, which - according to M. Bakhtin - is typical of critical moments in history.

Finally, to sum up the analysis, I attempt to examine how the liminal discourse of space and time changes in a situation of the new and - as it is regarded by some scholars - “post-transitional” Russia.

## **History textbooks in Romania after the fall of the communist regime**

Adriana Cupcea

National history is important for any state and its political community because it represents an essential instrument for supporting the citizens' loyalty and national sentiments. For the communist states, the control over history writing and historiography was important as it helped both to preserve and legitimize their control over the society. The disappearance of the communist ideological framework in 1989 determined a series of radical changes in the organization of the national educational systems.

In this period, heated discussions over the issues such as opting for centralization or decentralization in the educational process occurred, but the main effort in this field was directed towards the elimination of the Marxist scheme in interpreting history and to the removal of the communist period from the contemporary history.

This historical rupture with the ethnic conflicts and economic crisis that followed and the uncertainty created by these events passed on. What remains from this early period is an increasing

nostalgic public discourse regarding certain historical moments in the national history that determined a review of the collective past.

The Romanian history textbooks published after 1989 failed not only the scientific criteria but also their content was highly influenced by the way in which history was written during the communist period. They contained large pieces of information focusing on major events and historical figures and consequently ignoring other subjects such as daily and social life, mentalities, historical demography. The emphasis was on a positivist replication of political information of the historical events. These issues fall broadly Romania in the regional context.

My paper will focus on the Romanian history textbooks published after 1989 and also on the efforts to use them as instruments in the revision of the history teaching during the post-communist period. The first part of the paper will be an overview over history textbooks' evolution after December 1989 focusing on the following issues: the historical perspective on the development of Romanian textbooks after 1989; the option for pluralist models in Romanian history textbooks after 1989; the characteristics of the Romanian history textbooks after the fall of the communism.

The second part of my paper will analyze the public reactions on the part on the civil society's actors and academic world concerning the rewriting of history textbooks and the way in which the history was taught in Romania. In other words, the paper proposes an analytical framework that depicts the traditional dichotomy between "Westernizers" and "Autochthones", the conflict that involved not only professional historians but also the representatives of the newly born Romanian civil society. Related to it, the paper will also consider how the ethnocentric myths inherited from the communist period has influenced the reform in history teaching and how it is still triggering heated debates among civil and especially political actors.

## **The Return of the Saints: national holidays in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1989-1993 and beyond**

Andrea Talaber

The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe did not usher in only political and economic changes, but also major cultural and symbolic developments. 'De-Communisation', whereby Communist elements were 'removed' from all aspects of society and culture, was the main process by which this took place. National myths and symbols were one of the primary fields of de-

Communisation. In my paper I will explore these processes through the changes made to national holiday commemorations between 1989 and 1993 in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. I focus on two aspects: how the newly elected democratic governments attempted to construct new national holidays and how the former national holidays were 'de-Communised'.

In Central and Eastern Europe national holidays and their rituals are important vehicles for the transmission of different notions of national myths and identity to wider society, and through which the historical past is remembered (and debated). It is thus not surprising that the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe adapted the narratives of national holidays and national symbolism to legitimise Soviet influence. National holidays such as May Day and Foundation and State Days were used to present Communism as the culmination of all previous national history.

After the fall of Communism both politicians and public desired a 'return to Europe', not only in an economic and political sense but also in a cultural and symbolic one. The adoption of Western economic and political systems was often easier than the cultural and symbolic transformations: there was widespread agreement on the adoption of democracy and capitalism, but far less on what post-Communist national identity was to be like or which 'stories' of national history were to be told.

In Hungary, for example, there was much debate over whether the 'revolutionary' 15 March, commemorating the 1848 uprising, or the more traditional and 'mythical' 20 August, commemorating St Stephen the medieval founder of Hungary, should be the main National Day (20 August was selected). Law VIII of 1991 eventually established the post-Communist national holidays and these have remained fairly stable ever since, with some notable exceptions (such as National Unity Day introduced on 4 June 2010). In Czechoslovakia after 1989 the Soviet/Communist national holidays were rejected and the interwar ones restored. The country was divided into the separate Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993 but the Czechs still celebrate the Foundation Day of Czechoslovakia on 28 October, in commemoration of a state that no longer exists. An attempt was made in 2000 to introduce a wholly Czech national holiday of Czech Statehood Day commemorating the medieval St Wenceslas, the Czech patron saint, but this has not proved as popular as Czechoslovak Foundation Day.

National holidays are thus one of the main areas where we can explore how the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 'de-Communised' after 1989 and how national identities were redefined.

## **National Development of Belarusians in the Context of Postcommunist Transformation. Between Nationalism and Patriotism.**

Nelly Bekus

The failure of democratization of Belarusian society, the emergence of the authoritarian regime are traditionally viewed as both a symptom of a lack of Belarusian identity and a result of weak Belarusian nationalism. At the same time, the Belarusian state governed by the president A.G. Lukashenka is often characterized by opposition as an anti-national state formation. In reality, however, the Belarusian authorities, despite the openly authoritarian mode of rule and a multitude of repressive mechanisms they use to suppress dissidence in society, implement their own national project in the social and political practice. It coexists and competes with the Belarusian idea articulated by the nationalist discourse. Thus, behind the screen of the political struggle between the authoritarian authorities and the democratic opposition there is a struggle for Belarusian national identity, for the right to set up its civilizational parameters and to establish the trajectory of its further development.

Each version of the Belarusian nation resorts to the historical discourse in order to create the foundation of Belarusian tradition. In the first part of my paper I would present comparison of these two versions of the Belarusian history. In the historical narrative represented by works of official historians truths and values of the official concept of Belarusian nation are being supported. This school describes the activity of the Russian power on Belarusian lands as positively affecting the development of the Belarusian nation; Orthodoxy is declared here “a Belarusian religion.” The alternative history emphasizes positive meaning of these periods of Belarusian past that are bound with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Commonwealth; the Uniate Church is depicted as the Belarusian religion. Accordingly, the conquest of Belarusian lands by the Russian Empire is depicted as an occupation. Each version of the Belarusian tradition establishes a historical alibi for this or that strategy of formulation of a modern image of Belarusian nation, selection of geopolitical guidelines, the system of social and cultural values.

Second part of my paper would address the different strategies of public manifestation of the oppositional and the official Belarusianness. The official Belarusianness is articulated via numerous social practices on the micro- and the macro-levels of everyday life, in which the state is involved directly and indirectly. In the case of alternative concept of Belarusian idea, it is a wide area of cultural articulations through which it becomes part of the mass consciousness, penetrating into the

space of self-images and self-representations. However, in Belarusian reality the influence of the alternative Belarusianness on Belarusians is limited by the independent press, the alternative cinema, music, and other spheres of subculture. Their main “technical” deficiencies are a disconnected event-trigger character and an irregular (sometimes, hardly any) access to the official public space.

The competing ideas of Belarusian nation provide their supporters and adherents with different formulas for building their national identity. The fact that one of them is a “state-run” national idea and the other one is opposed to the state create unequal conditions in this struggle over identity, by definition. The comparison of strategies of public manifestation of the official and the alternative Belarusianness provides an understanding of the logic of dominating self-description models.