Forgotten heroes and decline of hope in Polish civil society after 1989.

Aicja Kowalska

The first strikes in Poland under Communism was purely economic and the main goal of workers wasn't the fall of system. Poznań in 1956 or Gdańsk in 1970 represented a fight for a better standard of ordinary life, work conditions or higher salary. The idea of Polish independence was born later, under the various religious, cultural and social circumstances. At that time, connected forces of workers and intellectuals began to fight together for freedom. The mentality of nation changed, the spirit of "Solidarity" was born. Suddenly, in spite of martial law and economic difficulties of the 80s, people actually believed that they can change something. They stopped to be afraid because they saw how numerous they were. They didn't give up under the various repressions, contrarily, they were encouraged in further efforts.

As a result, a lot of resistant organizations was created. We can enumerate among them especially student's or youth's ones, which was oriented to combat against the system. We can count to those groups "Fighting Solidarity", "Federation of Fighting Youth" or The Groups of Resistance "Solidary". Those young people was connected not only with common patriotic goal, but mainly with a great friendship.

Those kinds of attitudes were transferred to the whole society, people was helping each other because they believed together in better future. In some cases, they sacrificed their families, careers or even lives…

Was it worth it? In 1989 the fight was over. We won. But what were the consequences? The "Solidarity" was disintegrated into two camps. The followers of peaceful transformation, who after the fall of Communism became the members of a new democratic government, were accused by their colleagues of a betrayal of common believes and of the "collaboration" with the "red enemy". Young people from the lesser- known organizations had been almost completely forgotten, and the society observing their idols fighting, lost the orientation who to believe. The economic transformation which came in pair with market liberation wasn't helpful in this situation. The huge wave of joblessness and hyperinflation, which dramatically lowered the level of life, shaked the believe in new democratic system. The people felt deceived. The lack of trust, so popular in Communism, didn't disappear. Instead of forming new democratic civil society, people

became trustless and passive. We can observe this phenomenon already in the elections in 1995, when the leader of "Solidarity" Lech Wałęsa loses the presidential chair…

This social disorientation, noticeable in younger and younger generations is observable till today. It reveals by a lack of electoral activity and an absence of formed civil society. Therefore, can we say that Poland became a transformation?

Politically and economically, for sure, but socially? In that matter, in my article, I would like to ask if in our nation the existence of civil society is possible at all, and if so, what way our society has to proceed to achieve this condition?

Historical development and the future of NGOs in Poland – organizational perspective

Jan Meisel-Dobrzański

Development of civil society and its institutions remains one of the greatest problems in post-1989 Poland. Complete reinvention of non-governmental sector has been so difficult due to low level of social trust and general lack of funding. In order to combat these two factors, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy undertook a series of measures, with introduction of a so called "1% mechanism" (basing on solutions previously implemented in Czech Republic and Hungary) being the most notable effort. However, despite a significant financial boost and stable democratic political system, NGOs in Poland still struggle with low level of participation and philanthropy.

My studies focus on management of non-governmental organizations as the main reason for this worrying stagnation. I analyze data which on one hand indicate rapid growth in numbers of NGOs since early 1990s and general incapability to effectively accomplish mission on the other. A comparison of non-governmental organizations in the West with ones in Poland clearly shows that the latter remain underdeveloped in virtually all fields of organizational management. Majority of NGOs in Poland do not employ professional staff, modern fundraising is largely unknown as well as there is virtually no use of project and performance management techniques. All these observations contribute to lack of stability of 3rd sector, which could be a major threat to long-term development of civil society in Poland. Epitome of this general observation is a very recent event, from the beginning of 2011: around 30% of organizations, entitled to make us of the 1% mechanism, lost this financial privilege due to their management's negligence or accountability problems.

In my research I point out internal organizational obstacles to development of NGOs in Poland, with lack of professionalism of 3rd sector managers being the most important one. A comparison of practices of Western and Eastern Europe illustrates anachronism of non-governmental management in Poland. Eventually, the paper is a SWOT analysis of polish NGOs and a presentation of scenarios for the future: gradual deterioration (dismantling of the 1%mechanism), recovery (due to introduction of professional management techniques) and outsorcing (with foreign NGOs taking over polish 3rd Sector).

The paper is based on official data: bills, statistics, strategies, brochures, white papers and niche research; professional literature (NGO management handbooks and periodicals), press releases and independently conducted interviews

Aspects of Socialist Culture as Perceived by Post-Socialist Youth of Slovakia, Poland and Bulgaria

Kalina Zahova

The paper offers a version of recent socialist past's culture as seen through the eyes of those who have not had the chance to witness it directly. The text attempts to look parallelly at the notions of young people in three former socialist countries – Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria - about the period before 1989 and its legacy in the present. For that purpose inquiries and interviews were conducted in 2009-2010, with respondents studying at the Bulgarian Cultural Institute (Bratislava), Comenius University (Bratislava), Bulgarian Primary and Secondary School "Hristo Botev" (Bratislava), Maria Curie Skłodowska University (Lublin), St. Kliment Ohridski University (Sofia), Paisii Hilendarski University (Plovdiv), and doctoral students at the Slovak Academy of Sciences (Bratislava). As it is in evidence from this list, the respondents were born predominantly between 1988 and 1994, that is to say they do not have direct observations of the socialist period. In order to make a comparison, another group of respondents was included, who were born in the 1980s and could have had early childhood memories of the life before 1989. All respondents are students in high school, university or doctoral students, therefore the study cannot be considered exhaustive or representative of all young people in Slovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria. Instead, it would try to offer certain viewpoints that hopefully older people (and for that matter scholars) might find curious and thought provoking.

The paper presents the results regarding young people's vision of socialist culture. It summarizes the major trends in the answers of the last part of the questionnaire, concerning the respondents' likes and/or dislikes of music bands/ performers, writers/books, films/directors, painters/architects/sculptors, from the period 1945-1989, as well as the cultural aspects in which the respondents find it obvious that their country is a former socialist country.

I believe that it will be very helpful to discuss the patterns seen through those results with young scholars working in similar areas of cultural studies. Furthermore, all young people from former socialist countries have personal and collective experience of the cultural transformations, and sharing conclusions during the conference hopefully might prove to be fruitful not only for my own research, but also for the other participants' work.

Is Polish Voter Rational? - an empirical test.

Marta Żerkowska-Balas

Relatively low turnout in Poland is the reason why various researchers make an effort to answer the question why some people cast the ballot and others do not. One of the theories which try to explain the phenomenon of electoral participation is the rational choice theory, according to which people calculate benefits and losses of a particular action and decide on the basis of utility maximisation (Downs 1957). A voter, before making a decision whether to vote, needs to take into consideration not only the benefit that the victory of particular party will bring him and the cost of voting, but also the probability that his voice will matter. If the overall benefit exceeds the cost of voting, one will vote, otherwise, he will abstain.

This model of voter's decision has many adversaries, however its use to explain turnout seems to be justified in case of new democracies of post-communist origin. There are various assumptions, that make it plausible to believe that Polish voter may be rational. Firstly, the research shows, that the basis of rational choice model, distance between voters' and parties' positions in the space of political competition, is statistically significant, as far as its influence on voter's turnout in Poland is concerned. Secondly, there are various studies, that claim that the party identification in post-communist countries seems to be of rational, issue based origins (Miller 2000, Miller and Klobucar 2000; Tworzecki 2003, Rudi 2006). What is more, nowadays majority of democracies experience de-alignment process, that results in decline of partisanship and simultaneous rise of significance of short term predictors of voter's decision (issues, leaders, etc. cf. Thomassen 2005). Voters seem to make a rational choice rather that express their loyalty.

In the present paper I am testing whether the rational choice model can be applicable to explain turnout in Polish parliamentary election. Using Polish National Election Survey data (2001), I try to answer the question, whether Polish voter is rational. It results that distance between parties and voters, cost of voting and probability that one's vote is decisive influence the propensity to vote in 2001 parliamentary election, which means that at least some voters in Poland decide whether to vote making a rational decision which aims in voter's utility maximisation.

Participation of youth in decision-making processes

Michał Brol

One of the most well-known polish motto showing connection between education and development of the country and their community is Takie będą Rzeczypospolite, jakie ich młodzieży chowanie. The main aim of my report is to present today's youth policy in Poland also on local level and the participation of youth. This is a large social group and – even if it sounds trivial – our future. Can they say Nothing about us without us? What kind of youth activity's forms and their functions at the every level can we describe? I would like to answer the question whether today's young people are able to continue the process of change?

Traditional cultural institutions in the face of transformation

Michał Chlebicki

The paper will focus on changes that refer to traditional polish institutions, including museums, theaters, cinemas, libraries, cultural centers and art galleries in the past twenty years. These communist flagships of culture that has survived the transformation developed different adaptive strategies. The paper will be based on official statistics, observations and case studies, which indicate the modern strategies used by the institutions. Moreover, the main patterns and trends of changes in the institutions will be presented

The unrealized potential of Polish civil society.
How to get closer to cooperative culture?

Sebastian Wacięga

It seems that the transformation in Poland after 1989 has proceeded in accordance with Ralph Dahrendorf neat formula. According to him constitutional reforms could be successfully implemented in 6 months, free market economy could be built in 6 years, but flourishing development of the civil society needs circa 60 years. The process of transformation in Poland has succeeded in the field of the legal and institutional solutions. However, there have still remained weaknesses of the civil society.

The latest report by the Institute of Public Affaires claims that "Poles are not very active and not very involved in activities oriented toward cooperation and working for the common good"[1]. There are problems with fulfilling functions of civil society like channeling social interests, build local communities or make citizens active in public sphere. There are two augmenting negative phenomena in the civil Polish civil society. The first is connected with the poor state of third sector organizations that are not solidly linked with the communities and don't have neither enough public confidence nor financial support from the society. The second obstacle is connected with diminishing will to undertake activities in public area. According to CBOS surveys between 2002 and 2010 the number of people who are not eager to cooperate outside the family augmented from 25 % to 33 %. Paradoxically, within the Polish society has fostered the sense of "civic strength" – the belief on individual impact on public affaires, efficacy of collective actions and the need of social solidarity. CBOS surveys have revealed that the belief in ability to have an individual impact on public affaires augmented from 7 % in 1992 to 36 % in 2010. This data indicates the civic potential which doesn't find its actualization in practice of public life.

The reason of weaknesses of Polish civil society is rooted in historical tradition of resistance against the state after the fall of Polish state in XVIII-century which was continued under the communistic regime. Historical, collective experiences have become the foundations of protest culture which is strong attribute of Polish civil society. In spite of radical change of political context in 1989 the Polish model of citizenship has remained rather "interventionist

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[1] G. Makowski, *Civil society in Poland – challenges and prospects,* [in:] *Democracy in Poland 1989-2009. Challenges for the future,* eds. J. Kucharczyk, J. Zbieranek, p. 115.

against" than "cooperative for". The protest culture is connected with lack of trust in public sphere and lack of experience of cooperation for constructive purposes.

How to built cooperative culture based on civic values and joint activities? The possible answer could be dissemination of the voluntary activities inspired at local level by cultural institutions. The voluntary cultural activities at local level like events involving communities could be the opportunities of cooperation for common god. The local cultural initiatives can play the function of catalysts evoking civic attitudes as well as cooperative practices and thus serving the active citizenship and realization of civic values present in the Polish civil society.

The Transformation of (and) Participation.
The Case of the Tenants Movement - Are Poles Able Fight for What Is Theirs?

Tamara Jurewicz, Karol Haratyk

With the completion of the so-called honeymoon of the *Solidarity* movement, the active participation of Polish citizens in the public sphere diminished drastically. According to data from CBOS, in 2010 as much as 72% of Polish women and men did not participate in the activities of any kind of social organisation[2]. The level of social trust is equally low – 72% of Poles agree that "one has to be very careful when dealing with others."[3] Some scholars call into question the existence of civil society in Poland. As noticed by Piotr Gliński, Poles are characterised rather by an anti-, than pro-civil awareness[4].

If civil society is to be – according to the republican tradition – the sphere of activity dedicated to common good, let us consider the more basic question: are Polish women and men able to fight for their own good in the broader sense. To what extent are they able to take part in the forming of municipal politics in agreement with their basic interest? Are they willing and able to participate in the sharing of power and in the responsibility that comes with it?

We will be looking for the answers to these questions by researching the emerging tenants movement in Cracow and Warsaw. What is the tenants movement? The two primary postulates of the movement, according to Andrzej Smosarski, an activist of the Warsaw Tenant Society, are as follows: "[Firstly] the return to state control over rents, relinquished at the end of 2004. Secondly – the undertaking of actions towards the rapid development of government housing." Most of the movement's postulates are directed at local authorities[5]. However, the basic problem of the movement is the lack of commitment of the people in whose defence the movement intervenes:

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[2] CBOS. 2010. *Aktywność Polaków w organizacjach obywatelskich w latach 1998-2010.* In: http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_016_10.PDF, dn. 2.01.2011.

[3] CBOS. 2010. *Zaufanie społeczne*. In: http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_029_10.PDF, dn. 2.01.2011.

[4] Gliński Piotr. 2005. *Aktywność aktorów społecznych – deficyt obywatelstwa wobec codziennej zaradności polaków.* In: W. Wesołowski, J. Włodarek (ed). *Kręgi integracji i rodzaje tożsamości. Polska. Europa. Świat*. Warszawa: SCHOLAR, p. 221-243.

[5] Smosarski, Andrzej. 2009. *Ruch lokatorski w działaniu: problem środka.* In: „Lokatorzy.pl", http://www.lokatorzy.pl/artykuly/ruch-lokatorski-w-dzialaniu-problem-srodka, dn. 6.01.2011.

"(...) even if a certain problem emerges and there is an organisation or a group of people willing to help in this, in dealing with this problem, they are treated as a company, so – *I want you to do it, but I won't get involved.*"[6]

Is the situation changing?
"In 2010 there were quite a few eviction blockades, but a wider movement didn't emerge from it, because it basically looked like this: a group of activists goes wherever they're called, by someone from Warsaw or nearby, but they don't try to organise these people in any way. At the moment we took a different approach in our tenant activities."[7]

Our research of the tenants movement will try to answer the question of the effectiveness of the strategies employed by the leaders of the movement for the sake of the activization of its beneficiaries. Andrzej Smosarski wrote: "Just in case, any official statistics or advanced scientific studies in this matter are non-existent, just as public debate."[8] We hope to contribute to changing the present situation.

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[6] A fragment of an interview with a representative of Federacja Anarchistyczna Kraków (Anarchist Federation Cracow), an organisation engaged in the tenants movement.

[7] A fragment of an interview with a representative of Lewicowa Alternatywa (Leftist Alternative), a Warsaw organisation engaged in the tenants movement.

[8] Smosarski, Andrzej. 2009. *Ruch lokatorski w działaniu: problem środka.* In: „Lokatorzy.pl", http://www.lokatorzy.pl/artykuly/ruch-lokatorski-w-dzialaniu-problem-srodka, dn. 6.01.2011.

The role of informal cultural initiatives in the development of local community in the period of transformation. Poland and Russia - comparative analysis"."

Victoria Dunaeva

In the period of transformation the typical phenomena is collision with new aspects of social, political, cultural and private life. However, as turned out, changes were not suit the mentality of all people. The social conflicts appeared with all its consequences: acts of protest, frustration or apathy. According to Piotr Sztompka, the culture plays in these changes the double role: as "means" (we can change something thanks to culture) and as "the product of change" (we can change the culture). It is also worth attention how German researcher Daniel Bell understands the role of culture: in the period of transformation the culture can become "the initiator of changes" . In Poland in the beginning of transformation "the reanimation of cultural life on local level" was visible. In Russia many researchers paid attention to cultural crisis.

In my speech I would like to present some conclusions of my empirical researches conducted in Poland and Russia for my PhD work titled "The place of institutions of culture in the development of local community after collapse of communist regime. Poland and Russia - comparative analysis"."

Civil Society and Democratic Responsiveness in Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic

Winne Ko

During the fall of communist regimes in the end of 1980s, countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been frequently quoted as prominent examples of 'revival of civil society'. In recent years, promoters of democracy have stressed the importance of civil societies as the bedrocks of a vibrant democracy. 20 years after transition to democracy, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic could be regarded as consolidated democracies without imminent danger of collapse of the respective democratic regimes. Nevertheless, these young democracies are not without worries, such as the rise of extreme right-wing parties and nationalism. There is mass withdrawal from the public sphere soon after the transition.

The paper attempts to evaluate how the demobilisation of the mass affects the quality of democracy in the three countries from a comparative perspective. A specific dimension of democracy is examined in the paper, *responsiveness*. Democratic responsiveness focuses on the linkages between voters and the elected officers. Are the members of parliament (MPs) held accountable for their electoral pledges? Being as an opposition forces in the transition years, a strong civil society in the post-transition era plays the role of checks and balances, performing tasks like channelling public discontent and express minor interests which are not catered by the main political parties.

The proposed framework is a multidimensional approach in assessing the strength of civil society and its effectiveness of democratic responsiveness in the three countries.

Normative Legitimization of Civil Society Values:
On the Specificity of Civil Life in Ukraine

Yaroslav Pasko

The paper deals with the analysis of the normative legitimization of civil society values in modern Ukrainian society. The analysis focuses on the determinants and basic interpretation of the processes of the value-normative legitimacy in modern epoch. The authors generalize theoretical approaches concerning civil society in European and Ukrainian societies, theoretical essence and practical moral importance of the civil society versions in Europe. In the process of analysis supposition has been made that the Ukrainian model of civil society legitimacy is different from European ones and based not so much on public participation and free private choice as on those forms of secularity which are connected with the destruction of Lebenswelt (life-world). This supposition is confirmed by sociological researches that allow us to identify the tendency to the reestablishing of the neo-patrimonial model of legitimacy in Ukraine that is inherited from Cesaro-Popism. In Ukraine, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, we can observe the shaping of neo-corporativist state contributing to social exclusion, and infringement of universal citizenship rights. Not only economic inequality but also the continual traditions of exclusion from political, civil, and social membership in the community is what stands at the root of injustice and lack of solidarity. Neo-corporativist state is based on feudal remnants that serve as a serious obstacle to the full implementation of citizenship and hinder the formation of close ties and organic solidarity. The corporate, group-based terms of feudal political culture precluded the full institutionalization of a civil society in Ukraine, and autonomy of the subjects of political process.

In contrast to the XIX century when the prominent group of exclusion was working class now in the XXI century the problem of citizenship in Ukraine is connected with ethnic, economic, religious, gender problems. One can talk of burning problems of inequality and injustice in society where relationships of submission became a factor of alienation and non-freedom. The state became the embodiment of irresponsible private interests which are incompatible with public good. Unfortunately, the absence of civil society institute inhibits the integration of various social groups in political, civil, and social life. One of the authors of citizenship concept, T. Marshall, more than fifty years ago characterized interrelationships between political, civil, and social aspects of citizenship: "The civil element is composed of

the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice… The political element comprises the right to participate in the exercise of political power… And the social element includes the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security…"

One may assert that in Ukraine none of the above aspects is realized to the full. We have typical patron-client relationships, hierarchy system which leads to social-cultural and political alienation. Ukrainian clientelism confronts with Putnam's treatment of this phenomenon. The latter sees the source of clientelist hierarchy in agrarian ties of obedience, while in Ukraine the hierarchical model of power was incorporated from eastern, highly industrialized region. This region has never had traditions of social and citizenship inclusion, the Magdeburg law, civil contract, natural law, civil society, and the freedom of horizontal ties typical of European tradition. The discourse of non-freedom and clientelism still dominates and makes any forms of solidarity and social trust impossible. This model of legitimacy is very dangerous for the democratic foundation of stateness and civil society shaping.

The conditions for civil society existing in Central Europe were created only for the fall of the Communist regime in 1989. We can observe the domination of informal collective civil and political participation in public affairs. Civil society is composed of many interest groups, associations, societies, non-governmental organizations and social movements. Non-governmental organization are categorized as service-oriented or advocacy organization. Service organizations focus on providing services, non-governmental advocacy organizations seek to defend the rights and interests of various social groups, try to transfer social problems to the political sphere, publicly express their positions, and monitors the decisions of the state bureaucracy and elected officials. We can observe the typology of non-governmental organizations.

	Type of activity	
Origin	Mainly service	Mainly advocacy
Old (before 1989)	Type 1 (recreation, sport)	Type 2 (professional organizations, unions)
New (after 1989)	Type 3 (Social services, heath, charity)	Type 4 (ecology, human rights)

Bologna process as a translator of European cultural values

into Ukrainian educational system

Yuriy Petrushenko

Ukraine is pursuing a policy of integration with European Union. But even the first years of reformation showed that it is impossible to achieve European living standards without respective changes in human values towards European ones.

In our opinion international development programs, which are based on international standards, can be treated as the most successful mechanisms of institutional changes in Ukrainian society. From this standpoint Bologna process can be considered as a translator of European cultural values into Ukrainian educational system.

We decided to check this hypothesis through the analysis of changes in cultural values of Ukrainian students who started to study according to Bologna educational system. We used the model worked out by Geert Hofstede who is the founder of ethnometric analysis. His model is based on the determination of 5 cultural dimensions, which can be used to specify and characterize dominant value systems of the representatives of different countries.

These dimensions are:

1) Power Distance Index (PDI) that is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.

2) Individualism (IDV) on the one side versus its opposite, collectivism, that is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups.

3) Masculinity (MAS) versus femininity refers to the distribution of roles between the genders.

4) Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.

5) Long-Term Orientation (LTO) versus short-term orientation.

We have carried out an investigation at the Sumy State University using Hofstede's model. The cultural dimensions were calculated for students before studying and after four years of studying according to Bologna educational system.

Table 1

The results of investigation of students' cultural values

Cultural dimensions	(PDI)	(UAI)	(IDV)	(MAS)	(LTO)
Average European values*	40	56	74	43	36
Cultural dimensions at the beginning of studying	91	98	51	60	40
Cultural dimensions after four years of studying	70	87	62	52	39

* Calculated based on Hofstede's investigations // www.geert-hofstede.com/ hofstede_dimensions.php

The results of the table 1 demonstrate uneven power distribution in Ukrainian society, high level of uncertainty, safety needs, dependence on external factors. Students of the first course tend to exhibit collectivist values, and to show preference to feminine values (friendship atmosphere, stability, manager personality, and interrelations) as compared to masculine ones (improvement, studying, benefits).

The results for the students of the fourth year of studying yield the following conclusions. The values of cultural dimensions for these students are much closer to European ones. We observe the highest progress in overcoming of the power distance and in gaining self-confidence. Hence Bologna system changes Ukrainian students' values and norms towards European ones. Moreover, on the grounds of the results of practical training, the students who have been studying according to Bologna system exhibit higher abilities to adapt to working conditions in enterprises, which have already implemented principles of Western management.